- mice-discuss - lists.micemn.net

MICE Server Updates
by Cameron Skappel Nov. 22, 2024

Nov. 22, 2024

I plan to update the MICE servers and firewalls Monday November 25th at 13:00 Central and Tuesday November 26th at 14:30 Central. I will do one route server per day. -- Cameron

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netflix/tyson
by Jeff Wilde Nov. 18, 2024

Nov. 18, 2024

Anyone having issues with it streaming. I think its just the fight not Netflix. I can view other stuff. [A picture containing icon Description automatically generated] Jeff Wilde * Network Engineer * Park Region Office 218.826.6161 * Direct 218.826.8330 * Fax 218.826.6298

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MICE 511 Server Maintenance
by Richard Laager Nov. 12, 2024

Nov. 12, 2024

In some tens of minutes, I will be switching MICE’s management infrastructure, including the website, to a new transit provider. This involves IP renumbering. If you have issues, drop me an email to my day job email here, or call/text me if you have my mobile number. -- Richard

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Game Update?
by Anthony Anderberg Nov. 2, 2024

Nov. 2, 2024

Based on traffic patterns it looks like a big game franchise started an upgrade cycle last night at 3am. Looks like both Call of Duty and Fortnite have been planning upgrades but I can’t find anything definitive. I really only play Kerbal Space Program and am not up to date on FPS games, can anyone confirm?

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Global Net (AS395466) Leaving MICE
by Global Net NOC Oct. 25, 2024

Oct. 25, 2024

Greetings – Unfortunately, due to ongoing issues with our transport into Minneapolis, Global Net will be leaving MICE on Thursday, October 31st, 2024. We plan to begin turning down BGP peering sessions on Monday, October 28th beginning at approximately 0500a CDT. Thank you to all who have established peering sessions with us, and for the MICE team who have provided us a great service since 2018 when we joined. We are: ASN: 395466 Speed: 10G IPv4: 206.53.175.96 IPv6: 2001:504:58::96 Thanks, Scott Reed Global Net NOC noc(a)theglobal.net<mailto:noc@theglobal.net> Global Net Peering peering(a)theglobal.net<mailto:peering@theglobal.net>

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Fwd: [arin-announce] Reminder of Upcoming Deadline for ARIN’s Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Enforcement for ARIN Online
by David Farmer Sept. 9, 2024

Sept. 9, 2024

If you still need to enable MFA on your ARIN Online Account, DO IT NOW! More than 15,000 ARIN Online Accounts have yet to enable MFA, which is nuts! Thanks. ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: ARIN <info(a)arin.net> Date: Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 11:25 AM Subject: [arin-announce] Reminder of Upcoming Deadline for ARIN’s Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Enforcement for ARIN Online To: <arin-announce(a)arin.net> On 7 October 2024, ARIN will lock all remaining ARIN Online accounts that have not enabled multifactor authentication (MFA). As of 1 February 2023, ARIN requires MFA on all new ARIN Online accounts. Users with accounts created before February 2023 were notified and encouraged to log in at their earliest opportunity, where they would be prompted to set up MFA. This step was taken to provide stronger security for the registry, reduce the risk of fraud, and increase confidence in the integrity of their ARIN resources. On 17 July, we announced that ARIN was continuing to take steps to secure the registry by enforcing MFA. We engaged in direct communications with 19,853 account holders linked to organizations with direct allocations, detailed reassignments, and reallocations who had not yet enabled MFA on their accounts. These users were notified that they needed to set up MFA within 60 days or their accounts would be locked, As of 4 September 2024, 15,593 accounts have not completed MFA setup. We are extending this deadline by two weeks to allow more time for account holders to enable MFA on existing accounts. We strongly encourage ARIN Online account holders who have not set up MFA to do so before the 7 October deadline. Users with locked accounts can contact Registration Services during ARIN operating hours, 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM ET Monday through Friday, to unlock and set up MFA and regain access to ARIN Online. ARIN relies on the support of its customers to ensure the accuracy and security of the registry. We rely on all our customers to follow best practices for account security and to report any suspicious activity to us immediately. Regards, John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) --------- Helpful Resources: Need help setting up your MFA? Visit https://www.arin.net/MFA to get started. You’ll find guides on enabling MFA via an authenticator application, SMS, or security key hardware. We also provide information on how to receive and save your MFA recovery codes, as well as what to do if you’ve lost access to your authenticator app, SMS phone number, or security key. -- =============================================== David Farmer Email:farmer@umn.edu Networking & Telecommunication Services Office of Information Technology University of Minnesota 2218 University Ave SE Phone: 612-626-0815 Minneapolis, MN 55414-3029 Cell: 612-812-9952 ===============================================

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Odd AWS transfer issue
by Danny Meister Sept. 7, 2024

Sept. 7, 2024

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New QCIX Mailing Lists
by Jay Hanke Sept. 6, 2024

Sept. 6, 2024

For those that are interested, QCIX has just added mailing lists. https://qcix.mailman3.com/ -- Jay Hanke, President South Front Networks jayhanke(a)southfront.io Phone 507-327-2398 https://southfront.io/ <https://southfront.io/path.html>

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Fwd: [Idr] [job@fastly.com: RFC 9234 route leak prevention in the wild!]
by David Farmer Sept. 4, 2024

Sept. 4, 2024

I think this is something we should add to our list Thanks ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com(a)dmarc.ietf.org> Date: Mon, Sep 2, 2024 at 8:36 AM Subject: [Idr] [job(a)fastly.com: RFC 9234 route leak prevention in the wild!] To: <idr(a)ietf.org> Hello IDR, You might enjoy a report back from the field on route leak blocking based on RFC 9234. Please see below. Kind regards, Job ----- Forwarded message from Job Snijders <job(a)fastly.com> ----- Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2024 13:33:00 +0000 From: Job Snijders <job(a)fastly.com> To: nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: RFC 9234 route leak prevention in the wild! Dear all, I'd like to share an update on RFC 9234 deployment. RFC 9234 titled "BGP Open Policy" aka the "Only-To-Customer" (OTC) BGP Path Attribute is an anti-route-leak mechanism which is *NOT* based on RPKI! (yes ... routing security is more than just RPKI! :-) The basic idea of 9234 is that BGP routers (based on their role in the Gao-Rexford inter-domain routing model) attach a special BGP Path attribute, or take action based on the presence and contents of this BGP Path attribute - with the intention to constrain a route's propagation radius to just the downstream customer cone of the neighboring ASN. Most operators will intuitively understand that any route propagating through multiple IX route servers operated by different IXPs is a route leak: ``` IXP_1 IXP_2 / \ / \ / \ / \ ISP_A ISP_B ISP_C (receives) (leaker) (originates) ``` (figure 1. propagation from right to left; leak scenario) In the above example, ISP_A originates a route towards IXP_1's route servers, IXP_1 propagates the route to ISP_B (so far so good); but for one reason or another ISP_B subsequently continues propagation of the route towards IXP_2's route servers, who in turn propagate it to ISP_C. ISP_B is forwarding IP traffic between ISP_A and ISP_C for zero revenue. ISP_A and ISP_C are probably not expecting ISP_B to be in the middle. This situation can happen as a result of a misconfiguration in ISP_B's equipment, even when all participants use IRR & RPKI ROV to attempt to mitigate the worst routing incidents. What does it matter / impact ============================ Calgary-based YYCIX deployed RFC9234 support in late 2022/early 2023 using OpenBGPD; and FranceIX deployed support using BIRD in Q2 2024. Both IXPs configured their route servers to reject BGP routes that have an OTC attribute attached, and to attach an OTC attribute when propagating routes to the Route Server's peers. As it happens to be, currently (Mon Sep 2 12:26:50 UTC 2024) a small route leak is happening involving both YYCIX and FranceIX Route Servers via an ISP connected to both IXP's Route Servers; with the leak being stopped at YYCIX thanks to RFC 9234! Appendix A contains a table of leaked IPv4 routes. Let's zoom in on 1 entry: ``` $ bgpctl show rib 157.185.154.0/24 detail BGP routing table entry for 157.185.154.0/24 6939 38040 54994 Nexthop 206.126.225.20 (via 206.126.225.20) Neighbor 206.126.225.20 (216.218.252.194) Origin IGP, metric 1911, localpref 100, weight 0, ovs not-found, avs unknown, external, otc leak Last update: 11:58:08 ago Communities: 0:2906 0:16265 0:16276 0:18638 0:41690 0:48641 0:49029 Ext. Communities: ovs not-found Large Communities: 53339:11:1 53339:11:3 Aggregator: 54994 [163.171.131.254] OTC: 51706 ``` (figure 2. inspecting an leaked route using OpenBGPD's CLI) In figure 2. one can see the route is marked as 'otc leak', this was made possible because FranceIX's route server's attached the OTC attribute with the ASN value set to their Route Server's ASN (51706). ``` YYCIX FranceIX . x <adds OTC> \ . \ / \ ISP_A 6939_38040 54994 ``` (figure 3. right to left: real world example of blocked leak) In figure 3 AS 54994 originates 157.185.154.0/24 and propagates a route towards the FranceIX route servers. FranceIX accepts this route (probably because an IRR route object exists) and propagates it onward with the "Only-To-Customer" attribute set to 51706. The route is received by AS 38040, who appear to propagate the route to their upstream 6939. << An AS 38040 router is likely misconfigured! >> Then 6939 sends its customer's routes to the YYCIX route server, but the YYCIX route server recognizes that the route already passed through a 'valley' and thus considers this a leak; and blocks further propagation towards ISP_A. Impact with partial deployment ============================== RFC 9234 is an easy mechanism to configure and debug for both small & large network operators and IXP route server operators. In the above scenario YYCIX and FranceIX are likely the only 2 entities in the entire AS path which support RFC 9234; but we're already seeing leaks being blocked despite partial deployment! It's not hard to imagine that many IX-to-IX route leaks can be blocked with only the IXP operators themselves enabling RFC 9234 support. The world's most populair RS implementations (BIRD and OpenBGPD) already support RFC 9234! Tens of thousands of IX customers would enjoy the benefits of a few hundred IXPs taking action. RFC 9234 has no dependency on the RPKI, this means tha What can you do? ================ Just ask your vendors (your hardware routers and IXPs) to implement and deploy RFC 9234! :-) The more people ask, the more it'll bubble to the top of the priority list. The cost of implementing & deploying RFC 9234 is excellent bang for buck. Closing words ============= Shout out to our friends at FranceIX and MSK-IX for being amongst the first IXPs to deploy RFC 9234! Your effort helped reduce the potential impact of today's route leak! Kind regards, Job (YYCIX volunteer) Appendix A: ----------- Vantage point: YYCIX Route Server 1 (rs1.yycix.ca) Timestamp: Mon Sep 2 12:31:50 UTC 2024 Destination Prefix AS_PATH 102.164.129.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 102.164.139.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 37649 37649 37649 37649 i 102.164.140.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 102.164.141.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 102.164.182.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.65.33.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.65.34.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.65.35.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.65.36.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.65.37.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.65.38.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.65.39.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 154.72.35.0/24 6939 37613 37100 37027 37063 327721 i 157.185.151.0/24 6939 38040 54994 i 157.185.154.0/24 6939 38040 54994 i 163.171.164.0/24 6939 38040 54994 i 192.150.250.0/23 6939 4651 4618 4618 63529 4621 3836 i 196.50.8.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 196.50.9.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 196.50.11.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 37649 37649 37649 37649 i 196.50.13.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 37649 37649 37649 37649 i 196.50.14.0/24 6939 37613 6758 37649 i 2001:67c:15f4::/48 6939 41103 i 2401:c500:fd08::/48 6939 4637 38040 54994 i 2a01:53c0:ff03::/48 6939 4637 38040 54994 i 2a01:53c0:ff0f::/48 6939 4637 38040 54994 i 2a01:58c0::/32 6939 16347 42487 i 2a03:8920::/32 6939 41103 i 2a03:d602::/31 6939 16347 42487 i 2a03:d606::/31 6939 16347 42487 i 2a0d:ee00::/32 6939 16347 42487 i 2a0e:5b80::/29 6939 16347 42487 i 2a0e:e080::/32 6939 16347 42487 i 2a0f:c540::/29 6939 16347 42487 i ----- End forwarded message ----- _______________________________________________ Idr mailing list -- idr(a)ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to idr-leave(a)ietf.org -- =============================================== David Farmer Email:farmer@umn.edu Networking & Telecommunication Services Office of Information Technology University of Minnesota 2218 University Ave SE Phone: 612-626-0815 Minneapolis, MN 55414-3029 Cell: 612-812-9952 ===============================================

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Re: [EXTERNAL] - Re: [MICE-DISCUSS] Peering with Google no longer available at MICE IX
by Jeremy Lumby Aug. 23, 2024

Aug. 23, 2024

I would be willing to bet if you looked just at the eyeball networks on MICE, 90% are getting the majority of their Google traffic across MICE, even if they have caches they are getting the fill across MICE in addition to the non cacheable traffic. Google's caches are not nearly as efficient as many of their competitors.I can confirm with over 10 years of experience dealing with Google that they are almost always very slow to upgrade.Jeremy LumbyMinnesota VoIP9217 17th Ave SSuite 216Bloomington MN 55425Main 612-355-7740Direct 612-392-6814EFax 952-873-7425jlumby(a)mnvoip.com -------- Original message --------From: Miles McCredie <Miles.McCredie(a)MIDCO.COM> Date: 8/23/24 6:34 AM (GMT-06:00) To: MICE-DISCUSS(a)LISTS.IPHOUSE.NET Subject: Re: [MICE-DISCUSS] [EXTERNAL] - Re: [MICE-DISCUSS] Peering with Google no longer available at MICE IX Curious how many MICE members are in each of the following buckets. Receive limited portion of Google traffic via MICE Midco and, I assume, US Internet are in this bucket Receive a significant portion of Google traffic via MICE today I’ve only got a couple years of experience with Google for Midco but my experience has been that Google will not always provide the cache capacity that I think is appropriate. The last two augments were triggered 9-12 months later than I would have liked. Could be my fault for creating new GNLs but… Miles McCredie Principal Network Engineer II-Core IP Office: 6052755192 Miles.McCredie(a)midco.com Midco.com Let's go beyond. From: MICE Discuss <MICE-DISCUSS(a)LISTS.IPHOUSE.NET> On Behalf Of Justin Krejci Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2024 5:25 PM To: MICE-DISCUSS(a)LISTS.IPHOUSE.NET Subject: [EXTERNAL] - Re: [MICE-DISCUSS] Peering with Google no longer available at MICE IX CAUTION: This email originated from outside of MIDCO. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. I am not sure what Google's stance is on deploying cache servers at an IX vs remote connection like the ones pending disconnection. If they were to deploy caching nodes at an IX, I assume they would still have a cache-fill requirement in terms of connectivity that has to come from somewhere... of which they appear to be disinterested in maintaining long distance connections going forward. So perhaps this is a donation opportunity for some to entice Google to deploy caching nodes at MICE? Donate local colo and transit bandwidth along with local MICE connectivity? We have numerous Google caching nodes in our network as well as multiple PNIs to Google, so their pending disconnect from MICE will likely have minimal direct impact on our eyeballs. -----Original Message----- From: Aaron Wendel <aaron(a)WHOLESALEINTERNET.NET> Reply-To: MICE Discuss <MICE-DISCUSS(a)LISTS.IPHOUSE.NET> To: MICE-DISCUSS(a)LISTS.IPHOUSE.NET Subject: Re: [MICE-DISCUSS] Peering with Google no longer available at MICE IX Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 22:03:01 +0000 Has MICE requested a cache box from Google? ------ Original Message ------ From "Anthony Anderberg" <AnthonyAnderberg(a)NUVERA.NET> To MICE-DISCUSS(a)LISTS.IPHOUSE.NET Date 8/22/2024 4:28:18 PM Subject Re: [MICE-DISCUSS] Peering with Google no longer available at MICE IX I've been surprised that folks haven't been talking about this more and am curious about everyone's thoughts - as MICE user-members but also in terms of MICE leadership and direction. As a user-member I feel somewhat conflicted: on one hand in an effort to maximize performance I could obtain transport to Chicago and connect to Google there, but I feel like doing so is making Google's problem into my problem and that doing so undercuts the goals of MICE. We've seen content providers move MICE's larger members toward local direct private peering, and I can understand rational behind that even if it shifts traffic away from MICE - but Google is proposing remote direct peering at member's cost which feels different. Of course nobody expects Google to subsidize our corner of the world, I am just curious if there are other aspects we should be thinking about. Thanks in advance, Anthony On 8/22/24, 7:24 AM, "Google Peering Operations No-reply" <peering-ops-noreply(a)google.com <mailto:peering-ops-noreply@google.com>> wrote: Dear Peer, This is a reminder that peering with Google will no longer be available at MICE Internet Exchange from 16th of September. As a result of unsustainable overheads associated with connecting to an IX using remote waves, we have made a decision to stop connecting to IXs that way. MICE IX falls under the category of IXs we remotely connect to. We will withdraw prefixes on 16th of September, and disconnect from the IX on 24th of September. We realize this may cause inconvenience for some peers. If there is another mutually present IX that we can peer in, we will be happy to help set up a bilateral session there - no multilaterals. If there is no mutual IX, traffic may have to be exchanged via indirect paths (transit links). We are not looking to connect to any additional IXs to replace the IX that we are leaving, but if you are considering connecting to another IX and not sure if Google will also be leaving that IX because of this measure, please reach out to us and we can share more. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, Google Network Operations To unsubscribe from the MICE-DISCUSS list, click the following link: http://lists.iphouse.net/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=MICE-DISCUSS&A=1 To unsubscribe from the MICE-DISCUSS list, click the following link: http://lists.iphouse.net/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=MICE-DISCUSS&A=1

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